Weather, climate, and the economy: Explaining risk perceptions of global warming, 2001-10 by Shao, Wanyun et al.
University of New Hampshire
University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Sociology Scholarship Sociology
1-2014
Weather, climate, and the economy: Explaining risk
perceptions of global warming, 2001-10
Wanyun Shao




Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge
Lawrence C. Hamilton
University of New Hampshire, lawrence.hamilton@unh.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/soc_facpub
Part of the Sociology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Sociology at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Sociology Scholarship by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please
contact nicole.hentz@unh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shao, W., Keim, B.D., Garand, J.C., Hamilton, L.C. Weather, climate, and the economy: Explaining risk perceptions of global warming,
2001-10. (2014) Weather, Climate, and Society, 6 (1), pp. 119-134.
Weather, Climate, and the Economy:
Explaining Risk Perceptions of Global Warming, 2001–10*
WANYUN SHAO
Department of Geography and Anthropology, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana
BARRY D. KEIM
Louisiana Office of State Climatology and Department of Geography and Anthropology, Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana
JAMES C. GARAND
Department of Political Science, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana
LAWRENCE C. HAMILTON
Department of Sociology, University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire
(Manuscript received 28 March 2013, in final form 26 August 2013)
ABSTRACT
Two series of national survey datasets (2001–10), supplemented with monthly temperature and precipitation
data and unemployment data, are used to examine how weather and climate, economic performance, and in-
dividuals’ sociodemographic backgrounds and political orientations affect public perceptions of global warming.
Consistentwith previous studies, political orientations play a key role in determining public perceptions of global
warming.Democrats and liberals aremore likely thanRepublicans and conservatives to see global warming as an
immediate and serious problem. Sociodemographic characteristics are also shown to be significant factors, with
young people, women, and racial minorities likely to show higher concern about global warming than their
counterparts.Moreover, individuals with lower income and higher levels of education tend to bemore concerned
about global warming. Net of these factors, summer temperature trends over the past 10 years, among other
weather and climate measures, are shown to have consistently positive effects on public perceptions of global
warming. This suggests that individuals whohave experienced increasing summer heat aremost likely to perceive
immediate impacts and severity of global warming. Surprisingly, macroeconomic conditions—represented by the
unemployment rate at the county level—do not appear to influence public perceptions of global warming.
1. Introduction
Despite decades of efforts by scientists to warn the
public about the perils of global warming (e.g., Tegart
et al. 1990; Watson et al. 1995; McCarthy et al. 2001;
Parry et al. 2007), there is still no public consensus on its
cause, existence, and impact (Nisbet and Myers 2007;
Pew Research Center 2007, 2012). According to the
scholarly literature, perceptions of global warming in
the United States are affected by many variables, par-
ticularly political orientation such as party identification
and political ideology (Dunlap et al. 2001; Dunlap and
McCright 2008; McCright and Dunlap 2011a), race and
gender (Leiserowitz 2006; Malka et al. 2009; McCright
2009;McCright andDunlap 2011b; Kellstedt et al. 2008),
age (Kellstedt et al. 2008; Krosnick et al. 2006; Malka
et al. 2009), income (Hamilton and Keim 2009; McCright
andDunlap 2011a), education (Malka et al. 2009;McCright
and Dunlap 2011a), and macroeconomic conditions
(Kahn andKotchen 2010). McCright and Dunlap (2011a)
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also provide additional sources through an extensive
summary of the literature addressing social and political
variables related to perceptions of global warming. In
addition, there is a growing body of literature that has
examined the effects of weather and climate on these
perceptions. For example, public perceptions of global
warming have been found to be linked to personal ob-
servation of local weather (Borick and Rabe 2010; Howe
et al. 2013; Krosnick et al. 2006; Li et al. 2011;Myers et al.
2013), actual short-term weather fluctuations (Egan and
Mullin 2012; Hamilton and Stampone 2013), long-term
temperature change (Hamilton and Keim 2009), and
weather extremes (Leiserowitz et al. 2012). However,
questions still remain regarding the effects of local
weather and climate on perceptions of global warming.
In this paper, we attempt to take the research of per-
ceptions of global warming to another level through the
analysis of two series of national survey datasets, cli-
matic data from the United States Historical Climate
Network, and county-level unemployment data.
Both sets of surveys used in this study—the Pew Re-
search Center for the People and the Press Polls and
CBS News/New York Times polls—ask the same (the
former series) or similarly worded (the latter series)
survey questions about global warming. Each series
of surveys also includes the same group of sociodemo-
graphic variables and political orientation variables
measured repeatedly over time. We merge both sets of
survey data with climate and unemployment data. We
analyze each survey individually, and we then pool the
surveys into two groups and conduct cross-sectional
analyses to examine how the social and political variables
(including age, gender, education, income, party identi-
fication, political ideology, race, and religious service
attendance), weather and climate, and local economic
conditions affect public perceptions of global warming.
By pooling the data, we increase the sample size and
temporal breadth of our analysis over that of previous
studies. Our analyses represent a comprehensive effort
to understand American risk perceptions of global
warming in the first decade of the twenty-first century
by integrating national survey data with place-specific
indicators of weather, climate, and unemployment
conditions.
Our objective is to explore relationships among de-
mographic attributes, political orientations, weather and
climate, the unemployment rate, and public perceptions
of global warming in both individual years and for data
pooled across a decade, from 2001 to 2010. In addition,
we adopt a comprehensive set of weather and climate
variables (including 10 different measures) to capture
the effects of both short-term weather fluctuations and
long-term climate trends. From these analyses, we aim
to examine whether specific measures of local weather
and climate are related to heightened risk perceptions of
global warming.
2. Data and methods
a. Data
The survey data for this analysis come from two sour-
ces: CBS News/New York Times polls and Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press Polls. For more de-
tails on surveys used in this analysis, see our supplemental
material (available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/
WCAS-D-13-00029.s1). The CBS News/New York Times
polls relating to global warming come from the Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research
(ICPSR). These data consist of surveys conducted
between June 2001 and August 2010. The CBS News
andCBSNews/NewYorkTimes surveys include similarly
worded questions relating to the impact of global
warming. The first dependent variable is derived from the
following question:
‘‘Do you think global warming is an environmental
problem that is causing a serious impact now, or do you
think the impact of global warming won’t happen until
sometime in the future, or do you think global warming
won’t have a serious impact at all?’’
In addition, the Pew Research Center for the People
and the Press Polls relating to global warming consist of
six surveys including those conducted from June 2006
to October 2010. These surveys all ask the same
question: ‘‘In your view, is global warming a very
serious problem, somewhat serious, not too serious, or
not a problem?’’
The primary focus of this article is public perceptions of
global warming based on these two questions. The CBS
News/New York Times and the Pew Research Center
surveys both include the same set of sociodemographic
and political orientation variables, although there are
differences in wording that prevent us from pooling sur-
veys across these two polling organizations. The CBS
News/New York Times poll series include gender, race,
age, education, income, party identification, and ideol-
ogy, while the Pew survey series has religious service
attendance in addition to the other variables. The geo-
graphic codes provided by the seven CBS datasets are
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) county
and state codes, while the six Pew surveys provide both
zip codes and FIPS county and state codes. This permits
us to merge contextual data including climate and
unemployment data with the survey data.
We suggest that there are two aspects of individuals’
risk perceptions as they relate to global warming.Global
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warming immediacy, which is measured in the CBS
News/New York Times series, introduces a temporal
element and involves individuals’ perceptions of the
time horizon for the occurrence of problems associated
with global warming. In other words, are global warming
and its associated risks here in the present, or are they
something that will occur in the long-term future or not
at all?Global warming severity, which is measured in the
Pew series, involves individuals’ perceptions of how se-
rious or severe the problem of global warming is to
humankind. In other words, is global warming a prob-
lem? If so, how severe a problem is it? These two concepts
represent two separate dimensions of how individuals
perceive the risks associated with global warming. Ideally,
we would like to have measures of both concepts in the
same dataset, but unfortunately our measures of these
concepts are found only in separate surveys. However, we
make the conceptual argument—untested in this paper—
that these two dimensions are related, insofar as in-
dividuals who perceive that global warming is a serious
problem andwho perceive that it is in the present or in the
near future will be most likely to be motivated to support
actions to alleviate the anthropogenic determinants of
global warming.
We supplement these survey data with long-term cli-
mate trends represented by temperature and precipita-
tion trends over the past 10 years prior to the interview
date, and short-term weather fluctuations represented
by the departure from normal temperature/precipitation
measured in standard deviation units over the month
prior to the interview date. A more detailed description
of these data and the variables that are derived from these
data can be found below.
Furthermore, we supplement the survey data with
unemployment rate data for the month prior to the in-
terview date.We also combine the CBS surveys and Pew
surveys into two pooled samples, respectively, and this
permits us to estimate models of global warming per-
ceptions over multiple surveys. Because all the indi-
vidual surveys have different numbers of respondents,
respondents in smaller surveys cannot be counted col-
lectively as much as those respondents in larger surveys.
Therefore, we use sampling weights based on the inverse
of the sample size proportion of the total sample size for
each survey to equalize the contribution of each survey
because of the varying numbers of respondents across
surveys. The result is that the weighted sample sizes for
each survey are identical.
b. Dependent variable
Public perceptions of global warming are the primary
focus of this paper. The merged data for the first part of
our analysis come from seven CBS surveys conducted
from 2001 to 2010. While the questions relating to the
expected impacts of global warming are similar, there is
variation in the wording across the surveys. We are able
to combine responses to create a comparable scale across
all seven surveys, and in the end we are able to measure
the first dependent variable, global warming immediacy,
in each survey on a scale from 0 (no impact) to 2 (impact
now). For more details on our approach to creating
a consistent measure, see the supplemental material.
The pooled data for the second part of the analysis
come from the six Pew surveys. The question wording is
consistent across all of these surveys, which provide four
responses about the seriousness of global warming:
‘‘very serious,’’ ‘‘somewhat serious,’’ ‘‘not too serious,’’
and ‘‘not a problem.’’ We code the second dependent
variable, global warming severity, on a scale ranging
from 0 (not a problem) to 3 (very serious).
c. Independent variables
1) DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
We include age, education, income, gender, and race
(black andHispanic) in the first set of analyses that use the
CBS series data. We include these variables and add re-
ligious service attendance in the second set of analyses of
the Pew series data. The response categories to most rel-
evant items on these two sets of survey data are somewhat
different. Therefore, the corresponding responses we
create based on each item are mostly different.
Specifically, for both analyses, we measure respon-
dents’ age in years, ranging from 18 to 99 years. For
the first set of analyses that use the CBS series data, we
measure education from 1 (respondent has not com-
pleted high school) to 5 (respondent has earned a post-
graduate degree). We measure income ranging from
1 (‘‘less than $15,000’’) to 5 (‘‘more than $75,000’’). For
the second set of analyses that use the Pew series data,
we code education on a scale from 1 (none, or grade 1–8)
to 7 (postgraduate training or professional schooling
after college), while we measure income on a scale
ranging from 1 (less than $10,000) to 9 ($150,000 or
more). The effect of age on public perceptions of global
warming is usually found to be negative, suggesting that
older individuals tend to show lower levels of concern
for this issue (Hamilton 2012; Kellstedt et al. 2008;
Krosnick et al. 2006; Malka et al. 2009; McCright and
Dunlap 2011b). The effect of income on perceptions of
global warming has a mixed record in the literature.
Previous research demonstrates that income has a neg-
ative effect on public perceptions of climate change
(Hamilton and Keim 2009) and concern for this issue
(McCright and Dunlap 2011b), although Hamilton
(2008) shows that higher levels of income are associated
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with greater concern for some impacts of global warming.
Here, we speculate that older people with less education
and less income are less likely to perceive global warming
as an urgent issue, or as a serious problem.
In addition, we posit that the public perception of global
warming is influenced by race and gender. The risk as-
sessment literature has identified the ‘‘white male’’ effect,
which indicates that racial minorities andwomen aremore
sensitive to, and therefore aremore concerned about, risks
because of their comparative vulnerability (Finucane et al.
2000; Marshall 2004). The white male effect has also been
well documented in the literature on perceptions of global
warming (Leiserowitz 2006; Malka et al. 2009; McCright
2009; McCright and Dunlap 2011b). Thus, we create three
binary variables to represent black respondents (‘‘black’’
5 1; ‘‘other’’5 0), Hispanic respondents (‘‘Hispanic’’5 1;
‘‘other’’5 0), and gender (‘‘women’’5 1; ‘‘men’’5 0) for
both analyses. We hypothesize that the coefficients for
these three variables are positive in predicting risk
perception of global warming.
Finally, for the second set of analyses that use the Pew
series data, we include religious services attendance in
our models. This variable is measured on a scale ranging
from 0 (never attend services) to 5 (more than once a
week). Attending religious services has been found to
have negative effects on public perceptions of climate
change (Hamilton and Keim 2009). Thus, we posit that
individuals who attend religious services more often are
less likely to believe global warming is a serious problem.
2) POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS
Party identification and ideology have been shown to
be important indicators of perceptions of global warm-
ing (Dunlap et al. 2001; Dunlap and McCright 2008;
McCright and Dunlap 2011a; Pew Research Center
2006). As for the analyses that use the CBS series data,
we measure ideology on a three-point scale, ranging
from 0 (liberal) to 2 (conservative). Party identification
is also measured on a three-point scale, ranging from
0 (Democrat) to 2 (Republican). We hypothesize that
people who are conservative and are Republicans are
less likely to perceive that global warming is an
immediate problem. As for the analyses that use Pew
series data, ideology is on a scale ranging from 0 (very
liberal) to 4 (very conservative). We measure party
identification on a scale, ranging from 0 (Democrat) to
4 (Republican). The implications associated with soci-
etal acceptance of global warming as an immediate and
serious problem are multifaceted. One of the key
implications is that to mitigate the effects of global
warming, large-scale involvement of government will be
required. Compared to liberals, conservatives tend to
favor individual freedom in the economic sphere and
private property rights over collective rights, as well as
free market over governmental intervention (McCright
and Dunlap 2011a). Dunlap and McCright (2008) note
an increasingly wide gap between Republicans and
Democrats on their views on climate change over the past
decade, with an increasing proportion of Democrats
accepting the occurrence of global warming and severity of
this issue as opposed to a declining trend among Re-
publicans. Therefore, we speculate that individuals who
aremore liberal and areDemocrats aremore likely to view
global warming as an immediate and serious problem.
d. Contextual variables
1) WEATHER AND CLIMATE
In this paper, we refer to weather as that which has
occurred over the recent month relative to the surveys.
We use the term climate to describe all time periods
longer than a month. Climate and weather data are
from the United States Historical Climatology Network
(USHCN) monthly temperature and precipitation data-
set (Karl et al. 1990). The USHCN provides a high-
quality, error-controlled dataset of basic daily andmonthly
meteorological/climatological variables from 1218 ob-
serving stations across the contiguous United States
(http://cdiac.ornl.gov/epubs/ndp/ushcn/background.html).
Using monthly temperature and precipitation data
from USHCN, we create four seasonal temperature
and four seasonal precipitation trends including winter
(December–February), spring (March–May), summer
(June–August), and fall (September–November) trends
over the past 10 years prior to the survey dates. These
variables represent the unstandardized regression coeffi-
cients from models that depict temperature or precipi-
tation as a function of a yearly time counter variable, and
therefore capture linear trends of temperature or pre-
cipitation over time. The selection of time frames for
trends of 5, 10, 20, or 30 years’ duration is without firm
theoretical foundation. The decision to select the 10-yr
trend over other somewhat shorter or longer time periods
is based on the consideration that although people tend to
have short memories, they are also more likely to find
environmental conditions salient if they are maintained
over a reasonable period of time. Moreover, in earlier
work we estimated a series of models using trends calcu-
lated over different time frames and ascertained that the
10-yr time frame generated results that were most con-
sistent with the data (W. Shao et al. 2013, unpublished
manuscript). Hence we use a 10-yr period to represent
climate trends facing society that are recent enough to be
remembered but long enough to be salient. We are aware
that the number of observations (i.e., 10 data points per
weather station) used to generate our trend estimates is
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small, but arguably the slope provides the best estimates of
the trends in temperature and precipitation for the most
recent period of climate affecting the public.
In addition, we include two weather measures to
capture short-term weather fluctuations. These two
measures are temperature and precipitation departure
from normal (DNT and DNP, respectively) over the
month prior to the survey date. To account for relative
weather fluctuations in different regions, these de-
partures are measured in standard deviation units. We
take this approach because of the differences in weather
and climate across the United States (e.g., North vs
South, high altitude vs low altitude, coastal vs conti-
nental) and the varying conditions and ranges of vari-
ability between sites that result from these geographical
variations. As such, we standardize the weather at each
location by making all deviations relative to the climate
at that specific site, all the while taking into account what
is considered to be within a normal range. We calculate
these two measures:
DNTi5 (temperaturei-normal temperaturei)/standard deviation of temperature(1981–2010),
DNPi5 (precipitationi-normal precipitation)/standard deviation of precipitation(1981–2010),
where DNTi and DNPi are respectively the local tem-
perature and precipitation experienced by respondent i,
temperaturei and precipitationi are respondent i’s local
average temperature and monthly total precipitation over
themonth before his or her interview, normal temperaturei
and normal precipitationi are the normal average of
monthly mean temperature and monthly total pre-
cipitation for that month, calculated over the period
1981–2010 (current normal period in climatology), and
standard deviations of temperature and precipitation
are the standard deviation of monthly mean tempera-
ture and monthly total precipitation calculated based
on the monthly average over the period 1981–2010.1
Collinearity tests are conducted to ensure that multi-
collinearity is not present among the climate and
weather variables, and an inspection of variance in-
flation factors (VIFs) reveals no evidence of multi-
collinearity.
The county and state FIPS codes provided by the
CBS/New York Times series and zip codes provided by
the Pew series data allow us to identify geographically
each respondent.2 In ArcGIS, we match the layer of
respondents’ locations with the layer of USHCN weather
station locations. Byusing the feature—that is, joining data
from another layer based on spatial location—provided in
ArcGIS, we then identify the weather stations that are
located closest to each respondent and use the monthly
temperature and precipitation data from that station.
Because there is an inadequate number of previous studies
on the effects of local weather and climate on public
opinion toward global warming, our hypotheses concern-
ing all these long-term local weather and climate indicators
are nondirectional except two—winter and summer tem-
perature trends. Warming winter temperatures in snow
country are associated with public perceptions of climate
change (Hamilton and Keim 2009). In warmer parts of the
country, people might be most aware of rising tempera-
tures during the summer due to the greater discomfort
from heat and the need for more air conditioning. There-
fore, we hypothesize that the winter and summer temper-
ature trends over the past decade are most likely have
positive effects on risk perceptions of global warming.
The other contextual variable is the county unemploy-
ment rate. In his theory of human motivation, Maslow
(1943) proposed hierarchies of prepotency, and arguably
this provides an explanation for the competing relationship
between concern for the environment and economy.
Human motivation and human attention are limited re-
sources. People tend tomeet their basic physiological needs
such as food, shelter, and economic stability before they
turn their attention to aesthetic needs such as arts, enter-
tainment, and environmental quality (Maslow 1943). The
ability of individuals to meet these needs rests in no small
part on their personal economic situation and the level of
economic performance in a political or economic system.
Hence it is possible that economic downturns will be per-
ceived as inhibiting individuals’ ability to meet their basic
needs, while basic needs will be met more easily when the
economy is doing well. Elliott et al. (1997) find that both
individual and macroeconomic conditions have significant
effects on public support for environmental spending.
1 The monthly data that we select depend on the date when each
survey was conducted. When the survey was mainly conducted
early in a particular month (i.e., before 15th of that month), we
extract the monthly average temperature and monthly total pre-
cipitation data on the month prior to the interview month. When
the survey was conducted late on a particular month (i.e., after 20th
of that month) or in the week between two months (i.e., from
28 April to 10 May), we extract the monthly average temperature
and monthly total precipitation data for the current month.
2We assume that each respondent is located at the centroid of
each county or zip code area.
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More recently, Hamilton et al. (2010) find a negative as-
sociation between unemployment rate (county) and in-
dividuals’ support for environmental rules. Similarly, Kahn
and Kotchen (2010) find evidence to support the assertion
that increases in the local unemployment rate (state and
county) are associated with the decrease of concern for
global warming, and therefore the decrease of intention to
mitigate global warming. County-level data on un-
employment rates are available from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor and are merged by county with the survey data. We
speculate that individuals who reside in counties with
higher unemployment rates tend to be less concerned
about global warming.
The inclusion of contextual variables raises some com-
plications in regression analysis. Specifically, the error
terms are not independent for observations that share
the same weather station or are located in the same the
county. There are two common approaches to address
this issue: 1) a multilevel model (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal 2008) and 2) clustered standard errors (Primo
et al. 2007). Unfortunately, the number of survey re-
spondents in each clustered unit is insufficient to permit
us to estimate amultilevel model. Given this, we estimate
our models with clustered standard errors, which require
fewer assumptions and less intensive computation com-
pared to multilevel modeling (Primo et al. 2007).
2) SURVEY FIXED EFFECTS
There are seven surveys in the CBS series data and six
surveys in the Pew series data. Therefore, for the CBS
series data, we create dichotomous variables for each of
six surveys, with the excluded survey representing the
(excluded) reference survey. For the Pew series data, we
create dichotomous variables for five surveys, with one
being the reference survey. The purpose of doing so is to
account for different mean values on the dependent
variable across surveys, including those due to the small
coding differences across surveys. For the sake of
brevity the coefficients for these fixed effects variables
are not reported in our statistical tables.
3) INTERACTIONS
Education has been found to have different effects on
perceptions of global warming among Democrats and
Republicans. While concern about global warming has
been found to increase with the level of education
among Democrats or liberals, these concerns decrease
with the level of education among Republicans or con-
servatives (McCright and Dunlap 2011a; Hamilton and
Keim 2009; Hamilton 2008, 2011, 2012; Pew Research
Center 2007). We suggest that partisanship and ideology
serve to filter information about global warming. Dem-
ocrats and liberals are more likely to prioritize
environmental concerns over economic concerns and
are hence more likely to be receptive to information
about global warming; on the other hand, Republicans
and conservatives are more likely to prioritize economic
concerns over environmental concerns and hence tend
to exhibit higher resistance to information about global
warming. To capture these effects, we include two in-
teraction variables in both analyses. First, we include an
interaction for education and party identification to
capture the variable effects of education on perception
of global warming across party lines. Following the
findings from previous studies, we hypothesize that the
effects of education on the dependent variable will be
positive among Democrats and negative among Re-
publicans, sowe expect the coefficient for these interactions
to be negative. Moreover, we posit that the relationship
between education and perception of global warming will
be positive among individuals who are liberal and negative
among those who are conservative. Hence, we create an
interaction variable for education and ideology; we expect
that the coefficients for this variable will be negative.
A summary of the variables used in our two analyses
can be found in Table 1.
3. Empirical analysis and results
a. Analysis I: Global warming immediacy
Wefirstmodel global warming immediacy as a function
of a range of social variables, long-term climate trends,
short-term weather variation, and unemployment rate.
We initially estimate this model separately for each da-
taset of the CBS survey series, although our main focus is
on the pooled surveys. We begin with the year-by-year
models, the results for which are summarized in the first
set of columns in Table 2. For the sake of brevity we re-
port only the statistical significance of the coefficients,
although the full results for each of the seven surveys can
be found in supplemental material. The detailed pre-
sentation on the results can be found in the supplemental
material. We present a brief report as follows.
To begin, we find that party identification and political
ideology are the twomost consistent predictor variables,
with significant negative effects on global warming im-
mediacy. Conservatives and Republicans are signifi-
cantly less likely to perceive that global warming is
causing impact now than liberals and Democrats. The
results lend strong support to the assertion that political
orientations play an essential role in determining public
opinion toward global warming. Moreover, the co-
efficients for the various sociodemographic variables are
less consistent. These demographic background results,
including inconsistencies regarding income and race,
broadly agree with those from other surveys as well.
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Among the weather and climate indicators, summer
temperature trend over the past decade has the most
consistent effect on global warming immediacy. The
unemployment rate at the county level over the month
prior to the interview date is not found to have any
significant effects on global warming immediacy so we
have no evidence from these data for the popular belief
that concerns over unemployment preempt individuals’
perceptions about global warming.
Fluctuations in the effects of some of these indepen-
dent variables across surveys are not totally unexpected,
particularly given the relatively smaller sample sizes for
some of the surveys. We gain a better perspective and
more confidence about overall effects of these variables by
pooling the survey data together and then re-estimating
our models to include a series of fixed-effect variables to
account for survey-to-survey variation. In Table 3 we
report the empirical results formodels using theCBS survey
series (models 1–3) and the Pew survey series (models 1–3).
In model 1 of Table 3 for the CBS survey series, we
report the coefficients for the independent variables, but
without the interaction variables. All of the social vari-
ables except race have significant effects on global
warming immediacy. As the results from this model for
the CBS survey series show, the observed effect of
gender conforms to the findings from most studies of
perceptions of global warming, with women significantly
more likely to view global warming as causing immedi-
ate impact. Race represented by blacks and Hispanics
are not significantly different than whites on this de-
pendent variable. Moreover, the coefficient for educa-
tion is positive, indicating that individuals with higher
education tend to perceive that global warming has an
immediate impact. On the other hand, the income var-
iable has a negative effect on global warming immedi-
acy. High-income individuals are less likely to perceive
the immediacy of global warming. Finally, we find that
older people are less likely to see that global warming is
causing immediate impacts; it appears that younger in-
dividuals are more likely to be receptive to information
about the immediate impact of global warming.
As for political orientation variables, the effects of
party identification and ideology are significantly nega-
tive, indicating that Republicans (Democrats) and con-
servatives (liberals) are less (more) likely to see global
warming causing immediate impact. Using results from
model 1 in Table 3 for the CBS survey series and holding
the values of all other independent variables constant at
their means, we estimate predicted probabilities across
the scales of party identification and political ideology.
To demonstrate the effects of party and ideology on
public perceptions of global warming, we present the
predicted probabilities for the relationship between
party and ideology, respectively, and three views toward
TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics for variables from the pooled CBS News and Pew surveys.
CBS survey series (2001–10) Pew survey series (2006–10)
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Global warming immediacy 1.20 0.82 0 2 — — — —
Global warming severity — — — — 1.95 1.07 0 3
Party identification 1.01 0.82 0 2 1.84 1.65 0 4
Ideology 1.20 0.74 0 2 2.23 0.96 0 4
Age 54.10 18.18 18 99 52.06 18.19 18 99
Gender 0.60 0.49 0 1 0.52 0.50 0 1
Education 3.23 1.18 1 5 4.74 1.62 1 7
Income 3.53 1.30 1 5 5.20 2.36 1 9
Black 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.10 0.31 0 1
Hispanic 0.04 0.21 0 1 0.06 0.25 0 1
Religious service attendance — — — — 2.72 1.61 0 5
Winter temperature trend 21.62 1.97 29.14 5.89 21.26 2.00 210.34 5.94
Spring temperature trend 0.32 2.05 25.65 8.34 0.17 1.57 25.41 6.03
Summer temperature trend 0.53 1.38 26.38 6.42 0.60 1.32 26.34 7.11
Fall temperature trend 0.11 1.29 24.38 7.33 0.43 1.39 24.38 6.55
Winter precipitation trend 20.01 13.21 284.29 57.39 0.89 12.29 283.21 51.81
Spring precipitation trend 21.77 10.92 240.75 44.84 20.08 15.16 2122.82 141.63
Summer precipitation trend 3.61 14.78 251.18 58.48 2.66 14.79 261.96 67.90
Fall precipitation trend 2.30 15.51 256.90 49.28 2.49 15.01 256.90 51.11
Average temperature
departure
0.41 1.02 22.82 2.97 0.41 0.80 22.69 2.94
Average precipitation
departure
20.24 0.89 22.39 3.96 20.00 0.95 22.18 4.92
Unemployment rate 6.67 3.24 1.60 23.90 7.04 2.98 1.40 31.80
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global warming. Based on the probabilities presented
in Fig. 1a, we find that, moving from 0 (Democrat) to
2 (Republican), the probability that individuals be-
lieve that ‘‘global warming is causing a serious impact
now’’ decreases from 61% to 29%, while the proba-
bility that one believes that ‘‘global warming won’t
have any serious impact at all’’ increases from 11% to
31%. For the statement ‘‘global warming is causing
a serious impact now,’’ the probability that Democrats
believe this is 61%, compared to 29% for Republicans,
while independents fall in between. For the statement
‘‘the impact of global warming won’t happen until
sometime in the future,’’ the probability thatRepublicans
believe this is 40%, compared to 29% for Democrats. It
appears that there is a consensus amongDemocrats that
global warming is having an immediate impact, while
Republicans are fairly equally divided among the three
options.
Likewise, based on the probabilities presented in
Fig. 1b, it appears that liberals and conservatives differ
considerably in their views toward global warming. As
one moves from 0 (liberal) to 2 (conservative), the
probability that individuals believe that ‘‘global warm-
ing is causing serious impact now’’ decreases from 64%
to 32%, and the probability of believing ‘‘global warm-
ing won’t have any serious impact at all’’ increases from
10% to 29%. Liberals are more likely to believe that
‘‘global warming is causing a serious impact now’’ (64%)
while only 32% of conservatives hold that view. For
the statement ‘‘the impact of global warming won’t
happen until sometime in the future,’’ the probability
that conservatives believe this is 38%, compared to 27%
for liberals, with moderates in between. Here again,
there is a relative consensus among liberals about global
warming immediacy, while conservatives are split
among the three options.
TABLE 2. Summary of coefficients for survey-specific models of public risk perceptions. Note that coefficients that are in the expected
direction (under directional hypotheses) and significant at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels are denoted by one, two, and three asterisks,
respectively. Additionally, for significant coefficients under non- or two-directional hypotheses, the direction is also reported by plus (1)
and minus (-) signs. The expected direction of the coefficients is reported in brackets.
CBS/New York Times surveys Pew Research Center surveys
6/01 4/07 10/07 12/07 2/09 4/10 8/10 6/06 1/07 4/08 5/09 10/09 10/10
Demographic attributes
Age [2] 2** 2** 2** 2* 2* 2**
Gender [1] 1** 1* 1*** 1*** 1*** 1*** 1*** 1* 1* 1*** 1***
Education [1] 1* 1* 1* 1** 1** 1* 1* 1* 1*
Income [2] 2** 2* 2* 2***
Race: Black [1] 1**
Race: Hispanic [1] 1* 1* 1***
Religious service attendance
[2] (Pew)
2** 2*** 2* 2* 2**
Political orientation
Partisan identification [2] 2*** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2***
Liberal/conservative
ideology [2]
2** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2*** 2***
Contextual variables
Winter temperature trend [1]
Spring temperature trend
[1/2]
Summer temperature trend [1] 2* 1* 1* 1* 1**
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Among the weather and climatemeasures, we find that
only one variable has significant effects on the dependent
variable. The summer temperature trend over the past
10 years—indicating the magnitude of rising summer
temperatures—exerts a positive effect on global warming
immediacy, indicating that individuals who experience
increasingly hot summers are more likely to believe
global warming is having an immediate impact now.
To illustrate the effects of climate, in Fig. 1c we
present predicted probabilities for the relationship be-
tween the temperature trend during the summer over
the past 10 years and individuals’ perceptions that
‘‘global warming is causing a serious impact now,’’ ‘‘the
impact of global warming won’t happen until sometime
in the future,’’ and ‘‘global warming won’t have a serious
impact at all,’’ controlling for the effects of all the other
independent variables. As individuals’ experience of
summers moves from26 (roughly the lowest point) to 6
(roughly the highest point) on the range of summer
temperature trend, the probability that individuals be-
lieve that ‘‘global warming is having a serious impact
now’’ increases from 32% to 55%, while the probability
that individuals believe that ‘‘global warming won’t
have a serious impact at all’’ decreases from 28% to
13%. The probability that people believe ‘‘the impact of
global warming won’t happen until sometime in the fu-
ture’’ decreases slightly from 39% to 32%.
Surprisingly, the unemployment rate at the county level
does not show any significant effect on the dependent
variable either for individual data analyses or the pooled
data analysis. This does not conform to previous research
findings about the relationship between public support of
the environment and the economy (Elliott et al. 1997;
Hamilton et al. 2010; Kahn and Kotchen 2010), but this
result might be due to the fact that the unemployment
rate—a proxy for macroeconomic conditions—does not
necessarily reflect personal economic conditions and in-
dividuals’ subjective judgments of the economy. The
local county-level economy does not appear to have
a direct effect on how people think about global warm-
ing. Instead, personal economic conditions involving
how an individual is doing economically (e.g., Is the
person unemployed? Did the person’s income increase
or decrease in the past year?) might compete with local
climate as a determinant of individuals perceptions of
global warming. In addition, objective macroeconomic
conditions do not necessarily translate into subjective
assessment of economic conditions. For many individ-
uals there is a gap between the reality of the economy
and individuals’ subjective judgments on the objective
economy. Regrettably, a variable representing either
personal economic conditions or an individual’s sub-
jective assessments of economic conditions is not in-
cluded in this dataset.
In models 2 and 3 of Table 3 for the CBS survey series,
we include all the independent variables from model 1
but also add two interactions for education with parti-
sanship and ideology, respectively. The coefficients for
the interaction for education and party identification
and for the interaction for education and political
ideology are both significant and in the expected di-
rection. In Table 3, model 2 for the CBS survey series the
FIG. 1. Predicted probabilities for
various categories on global warming
variable, by values of selected in-
dependent variables: CBS News/New
York Times surveys, 2001–10.
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coefficient for education is 0.272, which represents the
effect of education on public perceptions of global
warming immediacy among Democrats (i.e., those for
whom party identification equals 0). The coefficient for
the interaction variable for party identification and ed-
ucation is 20.156, indicating that the effects of educa-
tion on the log-odds ratio of the dependent variable
decreases 0.156 as party identification increases by one
unit in the Republican direction. The effect of education
for Republicans is 20.041 [i.e., 0.272 1 (2 3 20.156)],
suggesting that education barely has any effects on
global warming immediacy among Republicans. In
other words, as education level increases, Democrats are
more likely to view global warming as causing immedi-
ate impacts, while Republicans are slightly less likely to
do so. To illustrate the interaction effects for partisan-
ship and education in Fig. 1d, we present predicted
probabilities for the relationship between education
level and individuals’ perceptions that ‘‘global warming
is causing a serious impact now,’’ broken down by
Democrats, independents, and Republicans and con-
trolling for the effects of other independent variables by
holding them constant at their means. For Democrats
with low education (i.e., not a high school graduate), the
probability that they perceive ‘‘global warming is caus-
ing a serious impact now’’ is 48.5%; this rises to a prob-
ability of 70.5% for Democrats with a high education
level (i.e., postgraduate work or degree). On the other
hand, the relationship between education level and
perceptions of global warming impact is slightly nega-
tive for Republicans; the probability of perceiving that
‘‘global warming is causing serious impact now’’ de-
creases from 29.9% to 28% as education levels move
from the lowest to highest value.
In model 3 of Table 3 for the CBS survey series we
present estimates of similar interaction effects of edu-
cation and political ideology on global warming imme-
diacy. The coefficient for education (b5 0.440,Z5 7.79)
represents the effect of education for liberal identifiers
(i.e., those for whom ideology equals 0). For liberals,
there is a very strong positive effect of education on their
perceptions of global warming. Meanwhile, the co-
efficient for the interaction for political ideology and
education is negative and highly significant (b520.272,
Z 5 27.02), indicating that the effects of education on
the log-odds ratio of the dependent variable decreases
0.272 as political ideology increases by one unit (i.e., as
one moves from liberal toward conservative). In other
words, as education level increases, liberals are more
likely to perceive global warming immediacy while con-
servatives are less likely to do so. We calculate the ed-
ucation coefficient for conservatives as 20.104 [i.e.,
0.4401 (2320.272)], which indicates that conservatives
with higher levels of education are less likely to view
global warming immediacy. To illustrate the interaction
effects for ideology and education in Fig. 1e, we present
predicted probabilities for the relationship between ed-
ucation level and individuals’ perceptions that ‘‘global
warming is causing a serious impact now,’’ estimated
separately for liberals, moderates, and conservatives and
controlling for other independent variables constant at
their means. For liberals with low education levels (i.e.,
thosewho are not a high school graduate), the probability
that they perceive ‘‘global warming is causing a serious
impact now’’ is 40.4%; this rises to a probability of 79.7%
for liberals with a high education level (postgraduate
work or degree). On the other hand, the relationship
between education level and perceptions of global
warming impact ismoderately negative for conservatives;
the probability of perceiving that ‘‘global warming is
causing serious impact now’’ decreases from 36.2% to
26.2% as the education level moves from its lowest to
highest value.
b. Analysis II: Global warming severity
In this section we discuss the determinants of global
warming severity, but in this case we examine data from
several Pew Center surveys conducted between June
2006 and October 2010. We begin by modeling global
warming severity as a function of a range of social var-
iables (now including church attendance), long-term
climate trends, short-term weather variation, and un-
employment rate for each dataset of the Pew survey
series. Empirical results for the individual Pew surveys
are presented in the second set of columns in Table 2.
For more detailed discussion, see the supplemental
material.
We find strong effects for most of the demographic
and political predisposition variables on perceptions of
global warming severity. With the exception of black
racial status, there is evidence of demographic and po-
litical effects on the dependent variable. Local weather
and climate variables—represented by different combi-
nations of indicators—show significant effects throughout
these years except in the May 2009 and October 2010
surveys. Finally, the unemployment rate at the county
level only displays significant effects on global warming
severity in the survey conducted in June 2006. This con-
forms to the results in the analysis of CBS News survey
series.
In Table 3, we present results for models of global
warming severity using data pooled across all six sur-
veys. In model 1 for the Pew survey series we present
the coefficients for the model estimated without the
interaction variables. As one can see, all the socio-
demographic variables have significant effects on
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global warming severity. Specifically, women, blacks,
and Hispanics are more likely to view global warming
as a very serious problem than their counterparts. The
coefficient for age demonstrates that younger people
are more likely than older people to perceive that
global warming is a serious problem. Education and
income also affect perceptions of global warming, al-
though in opposite directions. Education is positively
associated with global warming severity; individuals
with higher education levels are more likely to accept
the severity of global warming as a problem. On the
other hand, income depresses perceptions of global
warming severity, with high income earners less likely
to perceive the severity of global warming. These
findings are consistent with both theoretical expecta-
tions and the findings based on our analyses of the CBS
News/New York Times data.
Religious service attendance has a significant and
negative effect on global warming severity. This suggests
that individuals who attend religious servicesmore often
are more likely to doubt the severity of global warming.
Based on the predicted probabilities from Fig. 2a, the
probability that people who attend religious services
more than once a week believe that ‘‘global warming is
a somewhat serious problem’’ is 40%, compared to 38%
for people who never attend religious services. On the
other hand, by a margin of 41%–32% people who never
attend any religious services are more likely to believe
that ‘‘global warming is a very serious problem’’ than
those who attend religious services more than once
a week.
Party identification and political ideology both have
significant and negative effects on global warming se-
verity, indicating that Republicans and conservatives
are less likely than Democrats and liberals to think that
global warming is a very serious problem. Using results
from Table 3, model 1 for Pew survey series, in Fig. 2b,
we show the predicted probabilities for the relationships
between party identification and perception of global
warming severity, holding all other independent vari-
ables constant at their means. For the statement ‘‘global
warming is a very serious problem,’’ the probability that
Democrats agree with this is 53%, compared to 20% for
Republicans. On the other hand, Republicans (37%) are
FIG. 2. Predicted probabilities for various categories on global warming variable, by
values of selected independent variables: Pew Research Center surveys, 2006–10.
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slightly more likely to believe ‘‘global warming is
somewhat serious’’ than Democrats (33%). The proba-
bility of believing that ‘‘global warming is not a prob-
lem’’ increases from 5% to 21% as one moves from
‘‘Democrat’’ to ‘‘Republican’’ on the partisanship scale.
Likewise, political ideology has a similar effect on global
warming severity. As Fig. 2c demonstrates, as in-
dividuals move from ‘‘liberal’’ to ‘‘conservative’’ the
probability that they believe that ‘‘global warming is
a very serious problem’’ decreases by 42%, while the
probability for they believe that ‘‘global warming is not
a problem’’ increases by 17%.
Similar to our findings of the CBS News/New York
Times data, we find that unemployment at the county
level does not have a significant effect on public risk
perception of global warming severity. This again reflects
the limited power of objective macroeconomic measures
to explain public perceptions of global warming.
Among the local weather and climate measures,
summer temperature trends and fall precipitation trends
over the past 10 years stand out as significant predictors
of global warming severity. Specifically, individuals who
have experienced increasingly hot summers over the
past 10 years are more likely to accept that ‘‘global
warming is a very serious problem.’’ To illustrate the
effects of this local climate indicator in Fig. 2d, we
present the predicted probabilities for the relationship
between summer temperature trend and our four out-
comes relating to perceptions of global warming sever-
ity, controlling for the effects of all other independent
variables. As the trend in local temperatures increases
from a low of approximately 26 to a high of approxi-
mately 16, the probability that one thinks that ‘‘global
warming is a very serious problem’’ increases from 30%
to 40%, while the probability that one believes that
‘‘global warming is not a problem’’ decreases from 13%
to 9%. Furthermore, individuals who have experienced
increasing precipitation during the fall season over the
past 10 years tend to believe that ‘‘global warming is
a very serious problem.’’ In Fig. 2e, the predicted
probabilities for the relationship between this climate
measure and the four perceptions of global warming
severity are shown.As the indicator for one’s experience
with precipitation during the fall moves from its mini-
mum (256) to its maximum (156), the probability that
one thinks that ‘‘global warming is a very serious prob-
lem’’ increases from 32% to 40%, while the probability
that one believes that ‘‘global warming is not a problem’’
decreases from 12% to 9%. It is interesting to note that
the fall precipitation has shown the greatest variability
across the conterminous United States over the past
92 yr (De Martino et al. 2013), which may be a contrib-
uting factor in these perceptions.
In models 2 and 3 of Table 3 for the Pew survey series,
we include two interaction variables, one for education
and party identification and the other for political
ideology and education, respectively. Both interaction
terms have coefficients that are statistically significant
and negative, indicating that education has different
effects on public risk perception of global warming se-
verity among Republicans and Democrats, on the one
hand, and conservatives and liberals, on the other.
Turning first to model 2 results for the Pew survey series,
we find that the coefficient for education is positive and
highly significant (b5 0.189,Z5 8.35); this suggests that
for Democrats (i.e., those who score 0 on the partisan-
ship scale) there is a strong positive relationship be-
tween education and the perception that global warming
is a severe problem.
Furthermore, the coefficient in model 2 for Pew sur-
vey series of the interaction for party identification and
education is negative and highly significant (b520.067,
Z 5 28.15), indicating that the effects of education on
the log-odds ratio of the dependent variable decreases
by 0.067 as party identification increases by one unit
(moving from Democratic identification toward Re-
publican identification). Accounting for both the edu-
cation and interaction coefficients, we estimate the
education coefficient for Republicans to be20.079 [i.e.,
0.189 1 (4 3 20.067)], indicating that for Republicans
the effects of education on global warming severity is
moderately negative. To illustrate, in Fig. 2f we present
predicted probabilities for the relationship between
education level and individuals’ perceptions that ‘‘global
warming is a very serious problem,’’ broken down by
strong Democrats, independents, and strong Re-
publicans and holding all other independent variables
constant at their means. For strong Democrats with low
education (i.e., 0–8 grades completed), the probability
that they perceive ‘‘global warming is a very serious
problem’’ is 35.6%; this rises to a probability of 63.1%
for strong Democrats with high education level (i.e.,
postgraduate work or degree). On the other hand, the
effect of education on perceptions of global warming
severity among strong Republicans is moderate; the
probability of perceiving that ‘‘global warming is a very
serious problem’’ decreases from 24.5% percent to
16.9% as the education level moves from its lowest to
highest value. Clearly, there is a strong difference in how
Democrats and Republicans translate education into
perceptions of global warming severity.
For model 3 for the Pew survey series, the coefficient
for education (b5 0.398,Z5 9.73) is once again positive
and highly significant, indicating that among strong lib-
erals increases in education result in perceptions of
global warming severity. Meanwhile, the coefficient for
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the interaction for political ideology in model 3 for the
Pew survey series is also negative and significant (b 5
20.148, Z 5 29.00), and this suggests that the effect of
education on the log-odds ratio of global warming se-
verity decreases by 0.148 as political ideology increases
by one unit (i.e., as one moves in the conservative di-
rection). This finding conforms to results in the first
study of this paper. What this means is that the co-
efficient for education on global warming severity
among strong conservatives is 20.195 [0.398 1 (4 3
20.148)] and significant, suggesting that the increase of
education suppresses perceptions of global warming
severity among conservatives. Similarly, as Fig. 2g
demonstrates, the effects of education on public per-
ception of global warming severity vary significantly
over the spectrum of political ideology. For strong lib-
erals, the probability that they perceive ‘‘global warming
is a very serious problem’’ increases from 26.1% to
79.9% as one increases the level of education. On the
other hand, education has a negative effect on public
perception of global warming among strong conserva-
tives. The probability that one perceives that ‘‘global
warming is a very serious problem’’ decreases from
32.6% to 12.7% as one decreases the level of education.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we investigate how sociodemographic
characteristics, political orientations, local weather and
climate, and unemployment affect public perceptions of
global warming. This task is accomplished by utilizing
two series of survey data and from two pooled cross-
sectional datasets. The CBS News/New York Times se-
ries includes a question that addresses issues of global
warming immediacy (i.e., are the risks of global evident
in our proximate future or in our distant future?), while
in contrast the Pew survey series addresses issues in-
volving global warming severity (i.e., is global warming
a problem and if so, how severe a problem is it?). We
speculate that these two dimensions are related, insofar
as individuals who perceive that global warming is a se-
rious and immediate problem are likely to be the most
motivated to support actions to alleviate potential im-
pacts of climate change.
What have we learned here? First, perhaps our most
important findings relate to the effects of weather and
climate contexts on how Americans think about global
warming. We consider in our pooled models the effects
of 10-yr temperature and precipitation trends for each of
the four seasons, as well as short-term temperature and
precipitation fluctuations, and it is interesting to note
that most of our coefficients for these variables fail to
achieve conventional levels of statistical significance.
There are two exceptions among the local weather and
climate measures. Most noteworthy is the 10-yr summer
temperature trend, which is found to have a strong
positive effect on both global warming immediacy (CBS
News/New York Times data) and global warming se-
verity (Pew data). We find that winter, spring, and fall
temperature trends do not have systematic effects on
global warming attitudes, but it appears that individuals
who reside in communities with increasingly hot sum-
mers are significantly more likely to perceive global
warming immediacy and severity than those residing in
communities with flat or cooling trends. What this sug-
gests is that actual climate changes play an important
role in shaping public perceptions of global warming.
Changes in summer temperatures are recent enough to
be remembered but are of long enough duration to be
salient, and hence these patterns of warming tempera-
tures affect significantly how individuals think about
climate change. Certainly one important take-away
message from this study is that local climate conditions
represented by summer temperature trends over a 10-yr
time period can have a discernible effect on attitudes
relating to the immediacy and severity of global warm-
ing. Second, while precipitation trends typically do not
have a systematic effect on attitudes toward global
warming, there is some evidence in the Pew data that fall
precipitation trends have a positive effect on percep-
tions of global warming severity. In two of our models
fall precipitation trends have moderate (but significant)
effects, and in a third model the effect just misses con-
ventional levels of statistical significance. We suggest
that more research is needed on the effects of pre-
cipitation on individuals’ perceptions of global warming.
Another important frontier is national-scale analysis
that can distinguish weather/climate effects from geo-
graphical differences, by including geographic indicators
in the models: for example, through mixed-effects mod-
eling (Hamilton and Keim 2009).
Second, we also confirm that sociodemographic var-
iables have strong significant effects on public per-
ceptions of global warming over the past decade.
Specifically, young people, women, and racial minori-
ties (including African Americans and Hispanics) are
more likely to show a higher level of concern for global
warming than their counterparts. On the other hand,
individuals with higher levels of income are less likely
to express concern about global warming; this may re-
flect a self-interest motive, whereby higher-income
individuals are resistant to concerns about climate
change because they may perceive that they would be
most likely to pay higher taxes to support the envi-
ronmental programs needed to alleviate global warm-
ing. We also find a direct positive effect of education on
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concerns with global warming; those with higher levels
of education tend to perceive global warming as an
immediate and severe threat, perhaps because they are
more likely to be exposed to scientific information
about global warming.
Third, political orientations have consistently strong
effects in terms of how the public views the immediacy
and severity of global warming. Democrats and liberals
are more likely than Republicans and conservatives
to express concerns about the immediacy and severity
of global warming. Furthermore, we find that the re-
lationship between education and public perceptions of
global warming is moderated by both partisanship and
ideology. As education increases, Democrats and lib-
erals are more likely to see the immediacy and severity
of global warming. However, the same pattern does not
hold true for Republicans and conservatives; as educa-
tion increases for these groups, views toward the im-
mediacy and severity of global warming becomeweaker.
We speculate that political dispositions serve as an in-
formation filter, withDemocrats and liberals more likely
to accept information about global warming while Re-
publicans and conservatives are more resistant to this
information. These results contribute more evidence to
the accumulating literature on the polarizing effects of
education along partisan and ideological lines (Hamilton
2008, 2011; Hamilton and Keim 2009; McCright and
Dunlap 2011a). We therefore replicate an important
interaction effect using extensive data collected over
a longer time frame.
Finally, the unemployment rate in respondents’ local
communities is not found to have any significant effects
on public risk perceptions of global warming, in contrast
to findings by Hamilton et al. (2010) regarding other
types of environmental concern. The difference between
our results and those of Hamilton et al. is a bit in-
explicable, although we note a difference in sampling
frame—that is, we use a national sample including ur-
ban, suburban, and rural areas whileHamilton et al. focus
on respondents from rural areas in a selected group of
states—that may possibly account for the differences in
our two sets of results. Our result also suggests that future
studies examining the effects of the economy on public
risk perception of global warming should adopt measures
to represent personal objective economic conditions or
individuals’ subjective assessments of those economic
conditions. Objective economic conditions do not neces-
sarily translate into subjective judgments on the economy,
and future studies should be directed to include variables
that measure the subjective judgment of the economy.
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